South Africa and USA trade: What are the scenarios beyond the ‘Africa Growth and Opportunity Act’ (AGOA) for South Africa’s wine exports and wine tourism sector? by Mbatha, C.N.
African Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure, Volume 8 (3) - (2019) ISSN: 2223-814X  
Copyright: © 2019 AJHTL /Author/s- Open Access- Online @ http//: www.ajhtl.com 
 
 
1 
 
South Africa and USA trade: What are the scenarios 
beyond the ‘Africa Growth and Opportunity Act’ (AGOA) 
for South Africa’s wine exports and wine tourism sector? 
 
 
Prof. C.N. Mbatha 
Professor of Economics  
University of South Africa 
School of Business Leadership 
Midrand, South Africa 
ORCID id: 000-0002-6990-6455 
Email: nhlanhla.mbatha@gmail.com 
 
Abstract 
  
The growing protectionist stance of the current US administration has potentially negative implications for 
trade welfare in many African countries including South Africa. The loss to South Africa of trade benefits 
under the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000, which is expected to expire in 2025, would be 
devastating for many sectors which have benefited under AGOA. These include the South Africa wine 
exporting industry, which has direct links to the country’s tourism in regions such as the Western Cape. 
Losing AGOA benefits would have a direct negative impact on a sector whose size was estimated at R36.1 
billion in 2015, endangering more than 300 000 jobs for mostly unskilled and semi-skilled workers.  This 
paper uses a partial equilibrium analysis and international trade data to estimate the negative trade effects 
that are likely to arise if South Africa were to lose its AGOA benefits from the US. The analysis estimates 
the directions and sizes of the negative trade effects for scenarios replacing AGOA tariffs with Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) rates for South African wine exports. It finds that, for all wine product lines currently 
benefiting under the AGOA agreement, a market worth more than R100 million would be lost if MFN tariffs 
were applied. Overall the impacts of trade restrictions from losing AGOA benefits would have negative net 
effects on global welfare even if the US government was able to raise revenues from imposing higher tariffs 
on South African exports. It is argued that South African public policy and the private sector need to ensure 
that the country remains eligible for AGOA benefits until they expire, while seeking and negotiating new 
trade agreements for the country’s exports to other destinations.  
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Introduction  
Given the current reviews of trade agreements and relationships which the United States (US) 
has with different regions and countries, it is important for policy to evaluate South Africa’s 
potential economic position if the country’s benefits under the current trade agreement with the 
US were to be reviewed and removed. In a simulation exercise the paper uses a partial equilibrium 
analysis to look at what the estimated potential trade flows and welfare effect changes would be 
between South Africa and the US if the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, 2000) benefits 
to South Africa were to be removed immediately. The exercise is important because the current 
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AGOA benefits to African countries are scheduled to expire in 2025.1 In addition, challenging legal 
developments involving SA’s meat producers and the South Africa government have already 
threatened an ‘out of cycle’ review of South Africa’s eligibility for AGOA preferential treatment in 
2015 by the US congress. The threat for such a review in the US congress came about when 
concerns were raised by US producers of poultry, pork, and beef ‘who complained that South 
Africa was violating AGOA by blocking US meat imports.’ (Naumann, 2016)2. To avoid such a 
review, the South Africa government addressed the US congress concerns by, for example, 
removing anti-dumping quotas for US meat products. Nonetheless, these developments illustrate 
that AGOA benefits to South Africa are not guaranteed and can always be reviewed and therefore 
South African policy makers and the public need to understand for planning what the economic 
implications there would be for having no AGOA agreement in place with the US as one of many 
other possible future trade scenarios. To present the estimates from a partial equilibrium analysis, 
this paper uses South Africa wine exports to the US because they have established links to the 
growth of the country’s tourism industry (see Hunter, 20173) and these products that have enjoyed 
the biggest growth in terms of export growth both to the European Union (EU) countries and the 
US under AGOA4 (see Analytix, 2014; SA Market Insights, 2018, etc.).  
In Section Two, this paper outlines the background on AGOA benefits to sub-Saharan countries, 
since 2000.  Section Three presents the orientation and research methodology adopted for the 
simulation. Section Four presents the importance of the wine exporting sector in South Africa. 
The discussion of results is in Section Five. A summary of policy implications and 
recommendations for South Africa are presented in Section Six.                     
Background and context  
The African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a developmental market access preferential trade 
programme that is enshrined in US legislation under the Trade and Development Act of 2000. It 
is non-reciprocal in nature currently afforded to 49 sub-Saharan African countries, with the 
inclusion of South Sudan in 2012 (Ismail, 2016).  Since 2000, AGOA has been extended twice, 
in 2004 and in 2015, by the former US Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, 
respectively. The main aim of AGOA is to promote two-way trade flows between qualifying sub-
Saharan African countries and the US. Some of the developmental objectives of AGOA are to: 
                                                            
1 Initially the Act covered broadly the period from 2000 to 2008. In 2004 former President Bush extended AGOA benefits to 2015. In 
2015 former President Obama further extended AGOA benefits to 2025 (see more details on these data at Tralac, 2018 online).  
2 The ‘out of cycle review’ of South Africa’s AGOA eligibility for preferential treatment, triggered by the US poultry, pork, and beef 
producers ‘who complained that South Africa was violating AGOA by blocking US imports (into South Africa) of their products’ 
(Naumann, 2016) signalled that AGOA benefits may not be guaranteed to last until AGOA’s expiration date of 2025.  
With the complaint from US meat producers, the former US President Obama ‘notified the House of Congress of his intention to 
suspend (in 60 days’ time) the application of duty-free treatment to all AGOA eligible agricultural goods from South Africa…’ (Cronje, 
2015). In his statement, former President Obama explained that taking the action to suspend (not terminate) South Africa’s eligibility 
would be appropriate to force South Africa into compliance by removing long-standing barriers to US trade and investment as required 
by section 104 of AGOA (White House, 2015). 
In response to the notification, the South African government lifted the 15-year old anti-dumping duties for a quota of 65 000 tons of 
chicken parts per year as well as restrictions based on health concerns which blocked poultry, pork and beef imports into South Africa 
from the US. This action has, however, been challenged by the South African poultry (SAPA) and pork (SAPPO) producers in court 
on the grounds that there was not enough evidence that the US was doing enough to eliminate health concerns arising from the 
‘porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS)’ into South Africa (Lovell, 2016). A successful court challenge by SAPA and 
SAPPO forcing the South African government to reverse the lifting of restrictive trade measures against US meat imports would keep 
the suspension of AGOA benefits to South Africa in place. The big and fastest-growing South African export sectors to the US as well 
as US consumers of South African imports would be the most negatively affected by the suspension. This would mean that the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs, like some of the trade barriers, would apply to most US and South African traded goods (exports and 
imports).        
3 Discussion of wine tourism industry in SA 
4 Wine exports to the US increased from 12.8 million litres in 2011 to 31.7 million in 2013   
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a) encourage increased trade and investment between the US and sub-Saharan Africa 
b) reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers and other obstacles to sub-Saharan Africa and US 
trade 
c) expand US assistance to sub-Saharan Africa’s regional integration efforts 
d) negotiate reciprocal and mutually beneficial trade agreements, including the possibility of 
establishing Free Trade Areas (FTAs) that serve the interests of both the US and the 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa 
e) focus developmental efforts on countries committed to the rule of law, economic reform, 
and the eradication of poverty 
f) strengthen and expand the private sector in sub-Saharan Africa, especially enterprises 
owned by women and small businesses 
g) facilitate the development of civil societies and political freedom in sub-Saharan region; 
etc. 
Among key factors outlined in Section 502 of the Act (Trade and Development Act of 2000), Sub-
Saharan countries qualify for eligibility for AGOA benefits if they have (or are in the process of 
establishing) a market-oriented economy; are characterised by political pluralism and the rule of 
law; have eliminated (or are eliminating) barriers to trade and investment of the US; have policies 
aimed at reducing poverty, improving health care, education, and private enterprise; have in place 
policies opposed to corruption; promote human rights. When eligibility is established, the US 
President would ‘designate a sub-Saharan African state for preferential duty-free treatment for 
additional products and textile and apparel articles not included for duty free treatment under the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)’ (Cronje, 2015). Currently, more than 4,600 product 
tariff lines form part of AGOA preferential treatment for products exported to the US from 
developing countries (DC) and least developed countries (LDCs) (Naumann, 2016). However, 
Patriage and Pienaar (2016) reported that not all AGOA and GSP benefits were taken full 
advantage of when looking at 2014 trade data. For example, of the 2,113 imported agricultural 
products entering the US, only 264 of such products came from South Africa. With respect to 
these agricultural products, 661 product lines were eligible under AGOA, but South Africa utilised 
only 44 of them. Nevertheless, some South Africa exporting sectors have shown great 
performances since AGOA benefits were extended to the country.  
Trade performance under AGOA  
Overall, Figure 1 shows that exports from all AGOA countries to the US grew by more than 373% 
between 2002 and 2008, relative to those from the US to AGOA countries, which grew by 165.3% 
(ITC Trade Map, 2017). 
 
Figure 1: AGOA exports to the US and vice versa: 2001 – 2016     
Source: ITC Trade Map (2017)  
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Sharp declines were experienced for both regions after the 2008 economic crisis, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. While both regions experienced recoveries from 2009, AGOA exports  from 2011 
onwards, declined again to levels even below those observed in 2002. Ismail (2016), and 
Partridge and Prinsloo (2016), attribute the second decline of AGOA exports after 2011 to a 
decline in oil prices affecting mostly west African countries like Angola and Nigeria.  
The drop in total AGOA exports to the US from 2011, fuelled by oil prices, resulted in an increase 
in the percentage share of South Africa to AGOA exports to the US. On the other hand, the drop 
in US exports to AGOA from 2015 was mirrored by a drop in US exports to South Africa. In 2016 
the value of US exports to South Africa was slightly higher than those observed immediately after 
2008. The list of top US exports to South Africa in USD values (Table 1) comprises mainly 
mechanical, electrical and chemical products, with cereals featuring just outside the top ten.    
Table 1: Top USA exports to South Africa in 2016 
Code Label Size in 2016 USD 
(‘000) 
84 
Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear 
reactors, boilers; parts thereof 904 710 
87 
Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling 
stock, and parts and accessories thereof 447 216 
85 
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts 
thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, 
television ... 363 876 
88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 334 155 
90 
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
measuring, checking, precision, medical or 
surgical ... 324 333 
27 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their 
distillation; bituminous substances; mineral ... 229 997 
38 Miscellaneous chemical products 211 405 
99 Commodities not elsewhere specified 195 907 
39 Plastics and articles consisting thereof 176 147 
30 Pharmaceutical products 159 261 
10 Cereals 124 739 
71 
Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-
precious stones, precious metals, metals clad ... 119 348 
Source: ITC Trade Map (2017) 
The list of top South African exports to the USA shows where South African exports have 
benefited the most under AGOA. Other than metals, natural resources and vehicles, agricultural 
products that feature prominently include beverages (wines), spirits, vinegar and fruits (SA Market 
Insights, 2018).   Agricultural products (SA exports and USA imports) form a large part on the lists 
of the fastest-growing products between 2001 and 2016.  This means that agricultural trade 
between the two countries has grown in substantial terms for those employed in exporting 
industries and for consumers in both countries. Therefore, the trade and welfare implications on 
South Africa and the USA stemming from a revision or removal of the AGOA agreement would 
have profound social impacts.5 Simulating the potential impacts on trade flows and welfare effects 
between the USA and South Africa as a result of a withdrawal of AGOA is important for South 
African policy. The simulation is partial and examines impacts from the perspective of agricultural 
                                                            
5 This is especially the case because US-South Africa trade has grown in the last 15 years. More than 5% of South Africa’s export 
trade with the world is with the US, behind China (6%), while Africa (17%) and the EU (15%) still hold on the top two spots. Almost 
7% of South African imports from the world come from the US, with the EU and China holding a 31% and 18.1% share of these 
imports, respectively.   
African Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure, Volume 8 (3) - (2019) ISSN: 2223-814X  
Copyright: © 2019 AJHTL /Author/s- Open Access- Online @ http//: www.ajhtl.com 
 
 
5 
 
products relevant to South Africa’s tourism industry, i.e. wine beverages and products. In the 
absence of AGOA or any other agreement, South African exports would face reciprocal tariffs in 
the US as laid down by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the form of Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) tariffs.        
Reciprocal tariffs   
Even without the threat from US meat products losing AGOA benefits in South Africa, there is an 
increasing ‘protectionist’ rhetoric from the current US administration that poses an additional 
threat. This means that there are no guarantees that AGOA benefits to South Africa, or other 
African countries, would remain in place until the expiration date of September 2025. This is also 
because AGOA benefits really do not form part of any negotiated trade agreement between the 
US and any of the AGOA countries. AGOA benefits essentially form a part of the developmental 
aid to sub-Saharan Africa and its sustainability relies mostly on decisions made by the US 
government. 
Recently President Trump succeeded in withdrawing the US from the 12-nation Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) agreement, which covers 40% of the world economy, citing that its terms were 
unfair to US producers. Mr Trump has also called for a six-months review of all US trade 
agreements and arrangements. He also threatened to terminate US participation in the Northern 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), while negotiations on its continuation are ongoing. 
The US and Korea trade deal has been classified as a ‘’horrible deal’’ by his administration (Wolff, 
2017).   
Therefore, most sub-Saharan African leaders should be alert, if not concerned, about the 
sustainability of AGOA benefits. It is reported that the US administration has also raised questions 
concerning the US’s African developmental policy. ‘With so much corruption in Africa, how much 
of our funding is stolen? Why should we spend these funds on Africa when (there is) suffering … 
in the US?’ (Love, 2017).   
Against this backdrop, this paper proactively simulates possible trade effects that may come with 
a demand from the US administration for a more evenly balanced or completely reciprocal trade 
agreement or arrangement between South Africa and the US. A simulation of such reciprocal 
treatment could be that South African exporters to the US face the same tariffs that face US 
exporters to South Africa. On average, South Africa applies 1.65% tariff rates against EU imports, 
4.08% against US imports, and 8.46% against Chinese imports. With the EU facing the lowest 
level of protection against its products, at 31% it has continued to dominate the share of total 
South African imports from the world, compared to the share of the US at 6.7%. This could be 
deemed an unfair deal by the US administration and a demand that SA products face the same 
MFN tariffs could be put forward.  
Orientation and methodology  
Among many other products, the growing SA wine exporting industry enjoys zero tariff rates in 
the US because of AGOA benefits. As mentioned, without AGOA benefits, South African wine 
exporters (HS-22046) would face MFN tariffs7. Hence, the partial equilibrium simulation in the 
paper estimates the trade effects of an increase in the import tariffs on wines as applied by the 
                                                            
6 This is an inclusive WTO commodity classification code for wines of fresh grapes, including fortified wines and other subcategories 
in terms of packaging.  
7 The Market Access Map (MAC) provides applied tariffs for different products between different trading partners including South 
Africa and the US.     
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US on South African wine exports. These trade effects include changes in the sizes of the 
consumer and producer surpluses stemming from changes in trade creation (or destruction) as 
well as trade diversion to alternative destinations, government tax revenues in importing 
countries, etc. In a sense these changes represent net effects on overall national welfares of both 
countries from tariff increases (or decreases).       
For estimating trade creation and diversion effects, the simulation is underpinned by neoclassical 
trade theory, for example the Heckscher-Ohlin model’s comparative trade advantage 
(Samuelson, 1971). In terms of identifying and estimating the welfare impacts on the ground (e.g. 
possible trade effects on poverty), a more institutional framework (e.g. Winters, 2000) is required 
that accounts for rippling or multiplier effects on core and associated industries in a national 
economy.   
The Heckscher-Ohlin model concludes that a country holds a comparative advantage in products 
the production of which is based on comparatively abundant factors. This means that a trading 
country should focus on production processes that use the country’s most abundant factors, 
relative to its trading partners to experience trade benefits (Samuelson, 1971). Empirical data 
from cross-country studies conducted by Dollar (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1995) indicate 
that indeed trade liberalisation in general leads to net economic growth. The ways in which such 
benefits are distributed among different sectors of society within the borders of a trading country, 
however, vary depending on various factors, including the structure and strength of the linkages 
between the trading and associated sectors (Winters, 2000).  
As discussed by Mbatha and Charalambides (2008) the investigation of links between trade 
effects and production and consumption sectors, individuals and households, distribution 
channels as well as the government sector (through varied distributional tools) accounts for 
institutional and social factors that link trade liberalisation processes to economic growth and 
poverty reduction. Additionally, the investigation must account for the regulations understood by 
all affected stakeholders including producers and consumers. Although acknowledging the 
importance of a thorough institutional investigation of such socio-economic environments for 
completeness, this study focuses only on the first layer of linkages, i.e. the link between an 
increase in tariff rates and estimated net trade effects on exporters, consumers and governments 
of the trading countries. The study uses the Single Market Partial Equilibrium Simulation Tool 
(SMART) of the World Integrated Tools Solution (WITS) (i.e. Wits Smart, 2011) to estimate the 
net trade effects based on neoclassical theory. The estimation and discussion of potential 
changes is limited to overall trade effects on exporters and the government revenue sector, which 
has re-distributional links to society.   
Simulation: parameters and assumptions  
In trade theory when tariffs are imposed or increased by one of the two trading countries, trade 
becomes limited and net global welfare declines. This is the case even when some stakeholders 
may benefit. The overall outcome of trade restrictions is negative.  For example, in the importing 
country the producers of the imported product benefit from a price increase on imports entering 
the local market because of reduced competition and the government of the importing country 
raises tariff revenues. However, depending on the size of the exporting and importing countries, 
global prices can increase affecting global welfare. Consumers in the importing country lose some 
of their surplus. Producers in the exporting country lose some of their market share. In the short 
run, consumers in the exporting country may benefit from surplus supply that has lost its 
international market until alternative markets are found or local production is reduced. A simple 
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illustration of the different effects on stakeholders in two trading countries is presented for a two-
country (2x2) world economy model in Figure 3.   
 
  
Figure 3: Trade effects on importing and exporting countries  
Source: (Suranovic, 2018) 
 
For the importing country in the figure, Pft is the free trade price of the traded product, where local 
demand exceeds local supply (D > S) by line BCD. In the exporting country supply exceeds 
demand by bcd. If the importing country imposes a tariff, the price of traded product increases to 
PIM in the importing country. In the exporting country, the price drops to PEX, with increased local 
supply that has lost its global market. In the importing country, the quantity of the imported product 
decreases from BCD to C (i.e. DIM – SIM). The quantity of the exported good decreases from 
bcd to g (i.e. SEX – DEX) in the exporting country.  
 
With higher prices in the importing country, consumers are negatively affected and lose some of 
their initial surplus. Less efficient local producers in the importing country benefit from higher 
prices. In the exporting country, exporters are negatively affected by declining prices alongside 
excess supply, but consumers in the exporting country benefit from the price decline. The 
government of the importing country would generate revenues from the tariff imposition. There is 
no revenue generation in the exporting country. This means there are winners and losers from 
tariff increases. However, the losses outweigh the benefits at a global level. The net effect of trade 
restrictions at a global level is negative. At national levels, the net effects of trade restrictions 
would depend on the sizes of the gains and losses to producers, consumers and governments. 
These gains and losses are depicted by the different areas in Figure 1, which illustrate the 
changes in levels of consumer and producer surplus alongside government revenues in the 
respective countries stemming from changing tariff rates. These changes represent the total trade 
effects illustrated in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Trade effects on various stakeholders in trading countries   
Welfare Effects of an Import Tariff 
 Importing country Exporting country 
Consumer surplus Minus (A+B+C+D) = loss Plus e = gain 
Producer surplus Plus A = gain Minus (e+f+g+h) = loss 
Government revenue Plus (C+G) = gain Zero 
National welfare  Plus G minus (B+D) = depends Minus (f+g+h) = loss 
World welfare Minus (B+D) minus (f+h) = loss 
African Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure, Volume 8 (3) - (2019) ISSN: 2223-814X  
Copyright: © 2019 AJHTL /Author/s- Open Access- Online @ http//: www.ajhtl.com 
 
 
8 
 
While national welfare in the importing country can in some instances increase with tariff 
imposition and the resulting price changes, which also depends on the slopes of the demand and 
supply curves of the product (linked to the responsiveness or elasticities to price changes), global 
welfare and national welfare in the exporting country would still decline as illustrated in Table 2. 
With respect to the slopes of the supply and demand curves, consumers in the importing country, 
for example, can be left even worse off if the slope of demand curve of the imported product is 
steep (which implies that the demand for the product is non-responsive to price changes). If 
consumers in the importing country cannot find a substitute for the product with a higher price, for 
whatever reason, then they are forced to pay more for the same quantity of the product. This also 
ensures that government revenues generated from the tariff in the importing country are high.8 
This means that it is important to make accurate or reasonable estimations or assumptions about 
the slopes (or price responsiveness) of the supply and demand curves of the product in question 
in the two trading countries.       
 
The simulation adapted from the WITS SMART (2011) model uses real trade data from varied 
sources including TradeMap. The model is fed by three trade databases which can be used 
individually or in combination. It contains the following databases: 
a) the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) TRAINS (Trade 
Analysis Information System): free access to all users 
b) the WTO (World Trade Organisation) IDB/CTS (Integrated database/ Consolidated Tariff 
Schedule): free access of tariff information. For import statistics, free access to all but 
WTO member government staff accesses the information at the national tariff line level 
(NTL) while others access information at the 6-digit level of the Harmonised System 
(HS) 
a) the UNSD (United Nations Statistics Division) COMTRADE: access is free to users, 
subject to certain technical restrictions regarding the number of downloadable records per 
query. 
 
Because of this combination of different datasets, WITS offers the largest country and period 
coverage available on international trade and market access information. The simulation allows 
for an investigation of impacts of unilateral, preferential, multilateral trade reforms on variables 
including the following: 
 
a) trade flows (import, exports, trade creation, trade diversion), 
b) world prices  
c) tariff revenue  
d) welfare changes in respect of government tariff revenues.    
 
Because the simulation is a partial equilibrium analysis it has advantages and disadvantages 
when compared to the general equilibrium models. These are discussed at length in McDonald, 
Punt, Rantho and Van Schoor (2008). One of the advantages of the partial equilibrium analysis 
is that its simulation permits analyses at disaggregated (or detailed) levels of sectors, e.g. this 
study of trade effects of restricting access for wine products from the South Africa to the US. 
General equilibrium analyses, on the other hand, allow investigations of the whole economy 
without going into disaggregated details at sectoral levels. Partial equilibrium analyses, however, 
can only be performed on a number of predetermined and fewer economic variables. In this 
sense, the analysis is sensitive to estimation errors, because economic systems often have 
                                                            
8 The same applies to the imposition of tax on products that are necessary and have few substitutes, or addictive products like 
cigarettes. Consumers pay more and generated revenues are higher.     
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unexpected dynamic linkages and feedbacks. This is one of the reasons why it is important to 
supplement partial equilibrium analyses with institutional discussions (e.g. Winters, 2000).   
In estimating the trade effects, the researcher specifies the anticipated changes of applicable 
tariffs as well as the elasticities of the supply and demand curves for the product. In this paper, 
we estimate the trade effects on South Africa and the US from anticipated changes in tariffs 
affecting South African wine exports to the US, from AGOA to MFN tariff rates. The discussion 
where elasticities seem reasonable to explore is presented in the following sub-section.   
Responsiveness  
The slopes of the demand and supply curves essentially indicate the level of competition in the 
market of the products under investigation. A flat supply curve or demand curve indicates that a 
high level of competition exists in a market. For example, a flat supply curve, which is depicted 
by a high value of responsiveness9, describes a competitive supply market for the product, where 
there are many competing producers and prices are set by the market not by individual producers.  
A steep demand curve on the other hand depicts a monopolistic market, where producers have 
some market power stemming from the nature of the product and the behaviour of consumers 
(e.g. consumer demand for products with limited substitutes). In a global environment of many 
competing wine exporting countries, it is reasonable to assume a flat supply curve for the 
simulation, with a responsiveness value infinitely larger than 1.  
For the demand curve the simulation assumes some level of imperfect substitution where wines 
from different countries have varying brand qualities and cannot be directly substituted for one 
another. For this reason the paper estimates trade effects using a substitution elasticity value that 
is close to (i.e. the absolute value of -1.5). Given the large datasets, the WITS SMART model 
estimates default values for income effects10 (import demand elasticity) for different types of wines 
or product lines. These are presented and discussed alongside their trade effects for each type 
of exported wine in the simulation scenario results in Section 5.          
Total trade effects: creation and diversion 
As mentioned, the values of elasticities indicate the gradients or slopes of the supply and demand 
curves presented in Figure 3 and alongside the price increases (stemming from tariff increases) 
the slopes determine the sizes of the areas represented in Figure 3. The net changes in these 
areas (presented in Table 3) are the total trade effects. Given the assumption of a competitive 
market and a flat supply curve, Figure 3 is then modified to Figure 4, where the supply curve is 
flat and also depicts the price line to indicate that world prices of wine are mostly determined by 
global markets.   
                                                            
9 (E=0) is perfectly non responsive / inelastic; (-1< E <0) is inelastic/ non-responsive; (E = -1) is unit elastic (proportional 
responsiveness); (-inf < E < -1) is elastic/ quite responsive; (E= -inf) is perfectly elastic / infinitely responsive to price changes.   
10 This is the responsiveness of consumers to the product dependent on their real income levels. For different products changes in 
prices have different effects on the real incomes (spending power) of consumers.   
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Figure 4: Welfare effects on importing and exporting countries in a perfectly competitive market   Source: Wits Smart 
(2011)  
 
In the modified model, with a flat supply curve fewer areas are identified in estimating trade effects 
from changing tariffs.  For the importing country, the price increase stemming from a tariff 
imposition leads to a drop in consumer surplus to area A, from areas A+ B + C. Some of the loss 
from consumer surplus (e.g. area B) goes to government tariff revenues. Area C represents the 
total cost (waste) of the trade restriction as a welfare loss to society.  In the exporting country, the 
price drop would again be good news for consumers, as consumer surplus increases from area 
A to areas A + B + C. Areas B and C are lost directly from exporting producers who have lost a 
market in the importing country. In the short run, consumers in the exporting country may not be 
able to consume all the additional products that are suddenly available in the local market. That 
would represent the cost of trade restrictions to society as area C in the exporting country. This 
would be the case at least in the short run until alternative trading country partners are found. 
These models form the conceptual bases for the WITS SMART partial equilibrium analysis in 
estimating trade effects like trade creation (destruction) and diversion as well as government 
revenues coming from changes in applied tariff rates. Before the results of the simulation are 
presented it is important to discuss the importance of the wine industry and its link to the tourism 
sector in South Africa in order to have a better sense of the substantive social impacts that are 
likely to emerge from losing AGOA benefits.                
The importance of the wine industry in South Africa  
Before simulating the estimates of possible trade, welfare and government revenue changes from 
a potential modification or loss of benefits to South Africa from a trade framework like AGOA 
between the US and South Africa, it is important to look at the extent to which the wine industry 
is important not just for the South African tourism industry but also for rural farming communities. 
Hunter (2017) explains that “tourism is highly geographical because its dimensions include 
human-environment interactions and landscape conservation, management of places and 
environments, environmental perceptions and a sense of place; spatial behaviour and human 
mobility”. For some economies, tourism is the most important source of economic activity and 
growth, with direct injections of foreign currencies into the GDP through contributions in 
interconnected sectors like travel, accommodation, etc. The World Travel and Tourism Council 
(WTTC, 2018) estimated that in 2017 the direct contribution of travel and tourism contributed 2.9% 
(R136 bn) to South Africa’s GDP and the figure was expected to rise by 3.6% between 2016 to 
2018. More than 1.5 million jobs were either directly or indirectly supported by the travel and 
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tourism industry. These are huge contributions and the wine sector is an integral part of that 
contribution, especially with respect to sectors offering services like entertainment, food and 
beverages, retail, cultural and recreational activities.  Most of wine growing takes place in the 
winelands of the Western Cape, where climatic conditions are the most suitable in the country. 
The conditions are influenced by diverse topography, miscellaneous soils, coastal fog, cooling 
sea breezes, moderate temperatures, etc. The winelands harbouring more than 300 wineries on 
well organised routes offer tourist services including wine tasting, first class accommodation, 
restaurants, spas, game lodges, golf courses, etc. (Hunter, 2017). Therefore, some of the 
contributions of travel and tourism industry to GPD and employment come directly from South 
Africa’s wine industry. In 2015, the wine industry on its own contributed R36.1 bn to GDP and 
generated almost 300 000 jobs, the majority of which are for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. 
The WTTC (2018) estimated these contributions would increase at 3.6%. This is one of the 
reasons Ferreira and Muller (2013) in Hunter (2017) consider the wine tourism industry to be a 
significant driver of economic and social development in the country. 
The wine industry is however not only important for South Africa’s local economy and social 
development. While the 2008 economic recession had a negative effect on the size of the wine 
exporting industry, there was a reported recovery around 2013, with Analytix (2014) reporting 
revenues increasing from R5 750.1 million in 2011 to R7 124.6 million in 2013. Since then the 
growth has declined by 2%, however (ITC Trademap, 2019). As reported earlier the US ranked 
6th as one of the biggest destinations of South African wine exports in 2014 (31.7 million litres) 
and in terms of growth, behind EU countries including the UK, Germany, Russia, France, and 
Sweden11. White wine exports continue to lead red and rosé wine exports in terms of volumes, 
although red wine prices have been historically higher until a collapse from R33.34 per litre in 
2008 to R16.58 after 2012. In the same period rosé prices increased from R31.73 per litre to 
R44.00. It should also be noted that a bigger proportion of wine exports to the US was in bulk 
volumes (68%) as opposed to being packaged (32%), which attracts significantly lower prices per 
litre (Analytix, 2014). In 2017 South Africa exported wines12 to the value of USD 58 874 000 
(R824 236 000) 13 to the US, at an equivalent ad valorem tariff of zero because of AGOA benefits 
(ITC Trade Map, 2019). A loss of some of this annual revenue because of a possible rise in tariffs 
in the US14 would be a direct blow to the wine industry in the Cape winelands especially. The loss 
would obviously have negative contributions to the travel and tourism industry and other related 
sectors. In the following section we estimate what the likely trade and welfare effects would be in 
both trading countries if South African wine producers were to face MFN tariffs instead of the 
preferred AGOA tariffs.                      
Presentation and discussion of data and simulation results  
Using the ITC Trade Map (2019) data in Table 4, the value share of wine exports to the US from  
South Africa (i.e. USD 59 009 000) was about 10% of total US imports of wine from the rest of 
the world (USD 6 164 466 000). Given the high level of competition in the sector, the share is not 
marginal. The share of South African exports to the US compared to South African exports to the 
rest is however lower, at about 8%15. It is of interest that the value of South African exports to the 
                                                            
11 Total volume of wine exports to the world was 517.4 million litres in 2013  
12 HS Codes: 220421; 220422; 220429; 220430 
13 At the exchange rate of USD 1 :ZAR 14 
14 Losing AGOA benefits would mean facing MFN tariffs for SA exporting producers, not only in the wine industry but also on more 
than 4000 other product lines. 
15 This has increased from 7% in 2013 (Analytix, 2014) 
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rest of the world is higher than that of total imports from the rest of the world to the US. This 
implies that South Africa is not small in the US in terms of wine imports.     
Table 4: SA wine exports to the US and rest of the world in 2017 (value and tariffs)      
HS-code Description Old AGOA 
preferential 
treatment 
MFN 
tariff 
rate 
Imports by US 
from SA: USD 
‘000 
Imports by US from 
rest of world: USD 
‘000 
Exports by SA to the 
world USD ‘000 
220410 Wine; sparkling 0% 4,14% 2 448 1 247 817 25 186 
220421 
Wine; still, in 
containers holding 2 
litres or less 0% 3,40% 47 931 4 517 311 
479 913 
220422 
Wine of fresh grapes, 
incl. fortified wines, 
and grape in 
containers of > 2 l but 
<= 10 l (excl. sparkling 
wine) 0% 10,89% 135 51 238 
210 309 
220429 
Wine; still, in 
containers holding 
more than 2 litres 0% 9,03% 8 495 348 057 
- 
220430 
Grape must; n.e.s. in 
heading no. 2009, 
n.e.s. in item no. 
2204.2 0% 1,50%  43 
1 508 
Total - - - 59 009 6 164 466 7 169 160 000 
Source: ITC Trade Map (2019) 
The indication from the table is that, given the high level of competition in the wine exporting 
sector, an increase in tariffs (from AGOA tariffs to MFN rates) facing SA exports to the US would 
have significant negative effects. Finding alternative markets in the medium term would depend 
on variables including applicable tariffs to South African wine exports in other destinations as well 
as the quality of the South African brand compared   to those from exporting nations like France, 
Italy, Chile who are some of the biggest competition for SA in the US market. Given that EU 
countries like the UK (25%), Germany (21%) and Russia (8%) are the biggest importers of South 
African wine products, respectively, it is important to know what kind of trade arrangements these 
countries have with South Africa and her competitors regarding applicable tariffs. In 2017, 
preferential tariffs of zero applied to South African wines under the SADC Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) into the EU, which meant that these EU destination countries were on the same 
footing with the US under AGOA. Nevertheless, without AGOA or with the UK’s imminent exit 
from the EU16, the arrangements may be different and uncertain for SA wine exporters and policy 
makers.  
The wine export data, which illustrates the high level of global competition, reiterates why it is 
reasonable to assume a large elasticity of supply for the simulation exercise. What varies for each 
scenario are the default import demand elasticities (income effects) for each type of exported 
wine. These vary from inelastic 0.5 (for product line 220421) to elastic 12 (for product line 220430).  
Trade and welfare effects for different product lines 
                                                            
16 A separate analysis concerning Brexit’s potential effects, not just on SA wine exports, should be conducted as soon as possible 
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The data on exports from South Africa and the rest of world to the US are presented in Table 5 
alongside the associated trade effects for each product line.  
 
Table 5: Trade values and effects from the Smart simulation model for all wine products   
  
Data source: (ITC Trade Map, 2019)  
Table 4 indicates the applicable tariffs before (AGOA) and after (MFN) the trade regime changes 
for each of the export wine product lines as well as the sizes of the effects on total traded values. 
It indicates the amount of trade diverted and created and size of revenues collected with changes 
in tariffs per product. The specific discussions of the results from Table 4 for each product line are 
presented in the following scenarios for specified elasticities.    
The Scenario 1: Sparkling wines (220410): USD 2 448 000 
a) Change in market access: Increase of applied tariffs from zero (AGOA) to 4.14% (MFN) 
b) Assumed: Flat supply curve (very high export elasticity of supply, 100 000)   
c) Assumed: Substitution elasticity of /-1.5/ (elastic)  
d) Assumed: Default demand elasticity of /-0.6/ (inelastic) 
Results of limiting market access over a year: 
Current export value USD 2 448 000  Percentage 
Price effect None  None 
Trade creation  Negative USD 61 000 - 2.5% 
Trade diversion:  exporter view Negative USD 152 000 - 6.2% 
Total trade effect: exporter view Negative USD 213 000 - 8.7% 
Revenue effect: importer view Positive USD 99 000 4.0% 
 
From the partial equilibrium analysis of limiting market access, assuming a non-responsive 
demand elasticity (-0.6) on sparkling wines, about 8.7% of trade will be lost immediately to South 
African exporters. With adjustments in the medium to long term, 6.2% of SA exports would be 
diverted to alternative markets under current conditions, while 2.5% would be a total loss from 
actions that limit international trade. Meanwhile US government revenues would increase by USD 
US importer
South Africa as exporter, now facing MFN tariffs instead of AGOA tariffs Export supply elasticity 100000,0
MFN is tariff equivalents Substitution elasticity -1,5
2017 import values Thousand US$ Thousand US$
Old 
AGOA 
rate
New 
MFN 
Rate
HS HS Description
Import 
demand 
elasticity
 US from 
RSA 
US from 
RoW
US Total
Price 
effect
Trade 
Creation
Trade 
Diversion 
(exporter 
view 
only)
Total 
Trade 
Effect 
(Exporter 
View)
Revenue 
Effect 
(Importe
r view)
59 009    6 164 466 6 223 475 -0,08 -4 358 -3 721 -8 079 2 168
0% 4,14% 220410 Wine; sparkling -0,60063 2 448       1 247 817 1 250 265 0 -61 -152 -213 99
0% 3,40% 220421 Wine; still, in containers holding 2 litres or less-0,50952 47 931    4 517 311 4 565 242 0 -830 -2 420 -3 251 1 601
0% 10,89% 220422 Wine of fresh grapes, incl. fortified wines, and grape must whose fermentation has been arrested by the addition of alcohol, in containers of > 2 l but <= 10 l (excl. sparkling wine)-2,49053 135          51 238 51 373 0 -37 -22 -59 11
0% 9,03% 220429 Wine; still, in containers holding more than 2 litres-4,47154 8 495       348 057 356 552 0 -3 430 -1 127 -4 557 457
0% 1,50% 220430 Grape must; n.e.s. in heading no. 2009, n.e.s. in item no. 2204.2-12,1245 -          43 43 0 0 0 0 0
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99 000. Even though US tax revenues would benefit from limiting trade, in the short run this gain 
would not compare to South African exporter and global market losses, even with some trade 
diversion in the long run. With a more responsive demand (E>1), the negative total trade effect is 
marginally higher at 12%, with gains to US government revenues lower at 3.8%, of initial South 
African export value of USD 2 448 000 to the US. Overall the market for this product is relatively 
small which means the negative overall trade effects on South African exporters and associated 
sectors would not be as large in relative terms at R2 982 000 in 2017 prices.              
Scenario 2: Wine; still, in containers holding 2 litres or less (220421) USD 47 931 000  
a) Change in market access: Increase of applied tariffs from zero to 3.4% 
b) Assumed: Flat supply curve (very high export elasticity of supply, 100 000)   
c) Assumed: Substitution elasticity of /-1.5/ (elastic)  
d) Assumed: Default demand elasticity of /-0.50/ (inelastic) 
Results of limiting market access over a year: 
Current export value USD 47 931 000 Percentage 
Price effect None  None 
Trade creation  Negative USD 830 000 - 1.7% 
Trade diversion:  exporter view Negative USD 2 420 000 - 5.0% 
Total trade effect: exporter view Negative USD 3 251 000 - 6.8% 
Revenue effect: importer view Positive USD 1 601 000 3.3% 
 
Compared to the product in Scenario 1, this is a much bigger market. From the partial equilibrium 
analysis of limiting market access, assuming a non-responsive demand elasticity (-0.50) on wines 
in containers less than 2 litres, about 6.8% of trade will be lost immediately to South African 
exporters. With adjustments in the medium to long term, 5.0% of South African exports would be 
diverted to alternative markets under current conditions, while 1.7% would be a total loss from 
actions that limit international trade.  
 
Meanwhile US government revenues would increase by USD 1 601 000. Even though US tax 
revenues would benefit from limiting trade, in the short run this gain would also not compare to 
South African exporter and global market losses, even given some trade diversion in the long run 
Overall the market for this product is relatively larger which means the negative overall trade 
effects on South African exporters and associated sectors would be larger in relative terms at R 
45 514 000 in 2017 prices.  In percentage terms the effects are lower than those reported in 
Scenario 1 because the applicable MFN tariff rate as a trade barrier in Scenario 2 is lower at 3.4% 
versus 4.14%.             
Scenario 3: Wine of fresh grapes containers bigger than 2 litres but smaller than 10 litres: 
R135 000  
a) Change in market access: Increase of applied tariffs from zero to 10.89% 
b) Assumed: Flat supply curve (very high export elasticity of supply, 100 000)   
c) Assumed: Substitution elasticity of /-1.5/ (elastic)  
d) Assumed: Default demand elasticity of /-2.49/ (elastic) 
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Results of limiting market access over a year: 
Current export value USD 135 000 Percentage  
Price effect None  None 
Trade creation  Negative USD 37 000 - 27% 
Trade diversion:  exporter view Negative USD 22 000 - 16% 
Total trade effect: exporter view Negative USD 59 000 - 43% 
Revenue effect: importer view Positive USD 11 000 8.0% 
 
This is the smallest value of South African exports to the US. The losses in percentage terms, 
however, are highest of all export products (i.e. minus 43% of total trade effect) because the 
applicable MFN tariffs for this product at 10.89% are also the highest in the group. This indicates 
further that higher applied tariffs (and other barriers) lead to higher losses per respective product 
line. Nevertheless, in absolute value, South African losses stemming from losing AGOA benefits 
in this market would be marginal (at 0.05%) compared to other South African wine export products 
to the US.   
Scenario 4: Wine; still, in containers holding more than 2 litres: R8 495 000  
a) Change in market access: Increase of applied tariffs from zero to 9.03% 
b) Assumed: Flat supply curve (very high export elasticity of supply, 100 000)   
c) Assumed: Substitution elasticity of /-1.5/ (elastic)  
d) Assumed: Default demand elasticity of /-4.4/ (elastic) 
Results of limiting market access over a year: 
Current export value USD 8 495 000 Percentage  
Price effect None  None 
Trade creation  Negative USD 3 430 000 - 42% 
Trade diversion:  exporter view Negative USD 1 127 000 - 14% 
Total trade effect: exporter view Negative USD 4 557 000 - 56% 
Revenue effect: importer view Positive USD 457 000 0.6% 
 
The default demand elasticity for this product in the model is the most elastic at 4.4, which means 
that its level of responsiveness should be the highest if tariffs were to be increased from AGOA 
(zero) to applicable MFN rates, which are also relatively very high at 9.03%. Under these 
assumptions, the total trade effect from this scenario would be highest of all products, at USD 
4 557 000, which is 56% of potential total losses stemming from increased tariffs facing South 
African wine exports to the US. However, the tax revenues accruing to the US government would 
be the lowest on the list of wine exports to the US, even though the biggest negative effect on 
trade creation would have come from this product line.  The effect of a responsive demand 
elasticity leads to bigger losses (or gains) in terms of negative (or positive) trade creation in 
reference to Scenarios 3 and 4.  This means that an increase in price leads to bigger losses in 
terms of lost traded quantities for a flatter (i.e. responsive) demand curve, as depicted in Figure 
4 (i.e. QFT –> QIM). The revenues from taxes or tariffs on products with responsive (flat) demand 
curves are also smallest. For this product line they would only be 0.5% of the initial total value of 
South African exports to the US. Overall, the exercise illustrates among other things that imposing 
high tariffs on products with responsive demand curves would yield high losses to exporters, 
especially in terms of negative trade creation, and only marginal gains with respect to government 
revenues in the importing country.    
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Summary discussion of policy implications and conclusions   
The partial equilibrium analysis of trade impacts using the 2017 data on South African wine 
exports to the US illustrates that the effects of increasing US import tariffs on wine products from 
South Africa would lead to overall losses in South Africa both in terms of negative trade creation 
in South Africa and trade diversion to global competitors of wine exporters to the US, e.g. France 
in Europe and Argentina in South America. The losses in terms of negative trade creation are 
highest for products with higher demand elasticities (i.e. flatter demand curve). The gains to the 
US with respect to revenue generation would be highest for products with inelastic demand curves 
(small import demand elasticity) and lowest from products with elastic demand curves, as 
illustrated by Scenarios 2 and 4.  
More specifically, South Africa would, at least in the short run, lose a wine products market worth 
about USD 8 079 000 or ZAR 113 106 000 if AGOA benefits were to be replaced by MFN tariff 
rates. This is 14% of the current value of South African wine exports to the US, which is worth 
USD 59 009 000 or ZAR 826 126 000. A loss of ZAR 113 106 000 would be a large direct blow 
to the wine sector and its associated industries, including wine tourism, especially in the Western 
Cape. Given the interconnectedness of the wine production sector and the tourism industry, the 
losses of over one hundred million Rands would have rippling or multiplier negative effects inter 
alia on the employment rates in wine production and other associated sectors, including for 
example tourist attraction activities and accommodation. 
To protect the growing wine exporting and tourism industries it is important for South African policy 
in the short term to protect AGOA benefits from any out of cycle reviews, including those 
presented by challenges from meat imports from the US. In the long term the size of the South 
African wine industry alone was estimated at more than R36.1 billion in 2015 with more than 
300 000 jobs, mostly for unskilled to semi-skilled workers (Hunter, 2017). The WTTC (2018) 
estimating these figures would increase at around 3.6% between 2016 and 2018 to R32.7 billion 
and 310 000 jobs, respectively. Therefore, the industry is not only important for overall economic 
growth but also for redistributing resources among marginalised communities. The estimated 
potential losses from losing AGOA benefits, which are worth more than R 100 million per year, 
would have devastating direct effects on the GDP and employment levels in these sectors. 
Beyond 2025 it is important to design and put measures in place now that will mitigate against 
any potential trade loses when the AGOA agreement expires.  
It is important for the South Africa government to make sure that the country will remain eligible 
for future developmental support, like AGOA from the US, and preferential treatments (EPAs) 
from the EU. Given that the EU is the biggest market for many South African exports, including 
wines, the EPAs currently serve as buffers for any potential losses from unfavourable trade with 
the US. Beyond the US and the EU regions, South Africa must begin engaging in negotiations to 
expand its export markets through trade deals with other developed and developing countries. 
There are positive reports on how South African wines promotions are gaining traction, for 
example in Canada, Thailand and also China (Wine, 2016). These efforts need public policy and 
private sector initiative support to grow. Wine tourism is one of the sectors at the centre of these 
promotions. 
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